

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 AF-04 ARA-06 EUR-12 NEA-06 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 ACDA-05 /086 W

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P R 162130Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7554

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 5137

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNGA CB

SUBJ: KHMER AND KOREA IN 29TH GA: TIMING OF DEBATES: SITREP

NOV 15

REF: USUN 5077

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE RECOUNTS DEVELOPMENTS NOV 15 RELATING TO TIMING OF PLENARY DEBATE ON KHMER AND OF FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE ON KOREA. WHILE FRIENDLY COSPONSORS ACTED VIGOROUSLY DURING DAY TO HOLD LINE AGAINST BOUTEFLIKA'S EFFORT TO HAVE KHMER DEBATE PRECEDE KOREA DEBATE, THE ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. END SUMMARY

1. WE AND ALLIES ON KHMER AND KOREA ISSUES REMAINED ACTIVE ON TIMING QUESTION THROUGH DAY NOV 15 BUT MATTER REMAINS UNSETTLED.

2. UNDERLYING OUR EFFORTS ON QUESTION OF TIMING HAS BEEN CONVICTION THAT IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE ON BOTH KOREA AND KHMER

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QUESTIONS TO HAVE KOREA DEBATE CONCLUDE BEFORE KHMER. OUR

BASIC STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE FIRST COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ORTIZ DE ROZAS (ARGENTINA) TO HOLD FIRM ON TIMING OF KOREA DEBATE SO THAT IF GA PRESIDENT CONTINUES EFFORT TO TAKE KHMER UP JUST AFTER PALESTINE, THREAT OF SIMULTANEOUS DISCUSSION OF TWO ASIA ISSUES WOULD LEAD BOUTEFLIKA TO POSTPONE DEBATE ON KHMER. PART OF THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN ROK MAINTAINING FIRMLY POSITION WITH ORTIZ THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KIM'S SCHEDULE IS SUCH THAT CHANGE IN FIRST COMMITTEE TIMING WOULD BE HIGHLY INCONVENIENT TO HIM.

4. AGAINST BACKGROUND OF EVENTS REPORTED REFTEL, THAI AMBASSADOR ANAND AND OTHER SPOKESMEN FOR KHMER COSPONSORS MET MORNING NOV 15 WITH BOUTEFLIKA. BOUTEFLIKA MADE FULLY CLEAR THAT HE INTENDED HAVE PLENARY BEGIN DEBATE ON KHMER JUST AFTER PALESTINE AND HE ATTEMPTED TO PRESSURE KHMER SPOKESMEN TO GIVE BLESSING TO POSTPONEMENT OF KOREA DEBATE IN FIRST COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE TIME OF PLENARY DEBATE ON KHMER.

5. KHMER SPOKESMEN TOOK POSITION THAT THEY READY TO BEGIN KHMER AT ANY POINT, SUBJECT TO ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FIRST COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AND GA PRESIDENT. ANAND AND OTHERS STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH THEY INTERESTED IN KOREA ITEM THEY EMPOWERED TO SPEAK TO BOUTEFLIKA ONLY ON QUESTION OF KHMER. ANAND AND OTHERS SUGGESTED THAT PLENARY COULD CONVENIENTLY TAKE UP OTHER ITEMS, SUCH AS DECOLONIZATION, JUST AFTER PALESTINE AND WHILE FIRST COMMITTEE DISCUSSES KOREA, THUS AVOIDING SIMULTANEOUS KHMER-KOREA DEBATES.

6. BOUTEFLIKA TOLD THEM THAT ORTIZ HAD SAID BOTH KOREA SIDES WANT DEBATE TO BEGIN ON 25TH, AND BOUTEFLIKA ALLUDED TO POSSIBILITY (WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED IN BOUTEFLIKA-ORTIZ EXCHANGE AT TIME OF GENERAL COMMITTEE MEETING LAST WEEK) OF SUSPENDING KOREA DEBATE JUST AFTER OPENING STATEMENTS, PERMITTING PLENARY TO DISPOSE OF KHMER, FOLLOWING WHICH FIRST COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE KOREA.

7. BOUTEFLIKA WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN ANY EVENT HE AS GA PRESIDENT INTENDED TO SEE THAT THE WORK OF PLENARY TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER WORK OF COMMITTEES.

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8. IN REPORTING ON THIS CONVERSATION, ANAND AND NEW ZEALAND PERMREP TEMPLETON SAID THAT BOUTEFLIKA GAVE IMPRESSION THAT WE WOULD, IF NECESSARY, WORK TO LIMIT DEBATE ON PALESTINE SO THAT KHMER COULD BE TAKEN UP AND CONCLUDED BEFORE KOREA.

9. IN PLANNING SESSION FOLLOWING MEETING WITH BOUTEFLIKA WE AND OTHERS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DISCREETLY SEEK TO EXTEND PALESTINE DEBATE BY INDIRECTLY PROMOTING FRIENDLY INSCRIPTIONS

ON PLENARY SPEAKERS LIST, THAT WE SHOULD HAVE FRANK TALK WITH ORTIZ ON WHOLE PROBLEM (HAVING IN MIND ALSO THAT ARGENTINA VOTE ON KHMER PRIORITY STILL IN QUESTION), AND THAT WE SHOULD PREPARE TO DEAL WITH SCHEDULING QUESTION IN GENERAL COMMITTEE NEXT WEEK WHEN GC MEETS TO TAKE UP SOVIET REQUEST FOR INSCRIPTION OF NEW SIXTH COMMITTEE ITEMS.

10. USUN POLCOUNS MET AT NOON WITH BOUTEFLIKA'S CHEF DE CABINET BOUDJAKDJI TO DISCUSS GENERAL PLENARY QUESTIONS. AT THIS MEETING, BOUDJAKDJI COMMENTED THAT KHMER COSPONSORS HAD NOT, IN MEETING WITH BOUTEFLIKA THAT MORNING, SEEMED CONCERNED SO MUCH WITH TIMING OF PLENARY ACTION ON KHMER AS WITH PROBLEM OF SIMULTANEOUS PLENARY AND FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE ON TWO ASIAN SUBJECTS. BOUDJAKDJI CONFIRMED THEN THAT BOUTEFLIKA STILL INTENDED TO HOLD KHMER DEBATE JUST AFTER PALESTINE AND NOTED THAT GRUNK COSPONSORS PREFERRED THAT SCHEDULING.

11. IN MID-AFTERNOON ANAND HELD LONG PRIVATE TALK WITH FIRST COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ORTIZ. HE REPORTED ON THIS CONVERSATION LATE NOV 15 TO GROUP INCLUDING SELECTED KHMER COSPONSORS, OURSELVES, KHMER PERMREP CHHUT AND KOREAN MINISTER HAM.

12. ANAND TOLD US THAT ORTIZ HAD OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING HIS STRONG IRRITATION OVER BOUTEFLIKA'S "MANIPULATIONS" OF PRESIDENCY. ANAND ASKED ORTIZ HOW HE WOULD HANDLE SITUATION IF DURING CURRENT DISARMAMENT DEBATE IN FIRST COMMITTEE PRO-NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION PROPOSED CHANGE IN TIMING OF KOREAN DEBATE. ORTIZ SAID HE WOULD REFUSE TO PERMIT FIRST COMMITTEE RECONSIDERATION OF KOREA TIMING IN SESSION SUPPOSEDLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT: HE WOULD INSIST ON MATTER BEING BROUGHT BEFORE COMMITTEE ONLY IN APPROPRIATE CONTEXT. COMMENT: ORTIZ'S POSITION ON THIS THUS APPEARS TO PRECLUDE HOSTILE KOREA COSPONSORS SUCCEEDING IN CHANGING COMMITTEE  
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SCHEDULE THROUGH SURPRISE ACTION. END COMMENT.

13. ANAND ASKED ORTIZ HOW HE WOULD HANDLE QUESTION IF PRESIDENT RAISED IT IN FORTHCOMING GENERAL COMMITTEE MEETING. ORTIZ SAID THAT HE WOULD INSIST THAT GC NOT COMPETENT TO MAKE DECISION FOR FIRST COMMITTEE AND PROMISED ANAND THAT HE WOULD DIRECTLY CHALLENGE (DRAWING ON RULE 79 OF RULES OF PROCEDURE) BOUTEFLIKA'S RIGHT TO MAKE SUCH EFFORT. AS FIRST COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN IN GC, HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST BOUTEFLIKA THERE. ANAND SAID ORTIZ WAS NOTABLY FIRM ON THIS POSITION.

14. ORTIZ WENT ON TO TELL ANAND THAT HE IS FED UP WITH NORTH KOREANS. ORIGINALLY, ORTIZ RECALLED, NORTH KOREA SOUGHT EARLY FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE WHILE SOUTH KOREANS SOUGHT LATE DEBATE. NOV 25 SCHEDULING HAD BEEN COMPROMISE. IF NORTH KOREANS

PRESSED TO CHANGE SCHEDULE, ORTIZ SAID, HE WOULD INSIST THAT COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE CHANGE IN SCHEDULE AND SUCH WOULD REQUIRE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY UNDER RULES OF PROCEDURE.

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

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AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 5137

15. ANAND THEN RETURNED TO PROBLEM OF PLENARY SCHEDULING. CAPITALIZING UPON ORTIZ' EARLIER INDICATION THAT BOUTEFLIKA'S BIASED ACTIONS ON OTHER MATTERS HAD UPSET HIM, ANAND PROCEEDED TO POUR SALT IN THAT WOUND. BOUTEFLIKA, ANAND CAREFULLY TOLD ORTIZ, HAD TOLD KHMER SPOKESMEN THAT MORNING THAT BOUTEFLIKA WOULD INSIST THAT WORK OF PLENARY SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY OVER WORK OF COMMITTEE. ORTIZ REACTED WITH GRATIFYING ANGER. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD BOUTEFLIKA BOTH KOREAS WANT DEBATE TO OPEN NOV 25. THE FIRST COMMITTEE, ORTIZ SAID, HAD MADE FORMAL DECISION ON TIMING. THERE IS NOTHING THE PRESIDENT CAN DO, ORTIZ INSISTED, THAT CAN UNILATERALLY OVERTURN THAT DECISION AND HE ADDED THAT AS CHAIRMAN OF FIRST COMMITTEE HE WOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE HIMSELF TO DO SO.

16. IN REPORTING FOREGOING, ANAND EMPHASIZED THAT ORTIZ HAD PRESSED ANAND TO KEEP DISCUSSION CONFIDENTIAL. WE AND OTHERS AGREED TO DO SO.

18. CONSENSUS OF ALLIES AT END OF DAY WAS THAT ORTIZ' ATTITUDE  
WAS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL BUT THAT BOUTEFLIKA --  
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DETERMINED, RESOURCEFUL AND UNPRINCIPLED -- REMAINED SERIOUS  
THREAT. WE AGREED THAT WE THEREFORE MUST STILL PREPARE FOR  
PLENARY TAKING UP KHMER IMMEDIATELY AFTER PALESTINE DEBATE.  
DESPITE ADDITIONAL INSCRIPTIONS ON PALESTINE, WE MUST PREPARE  
FOR BOUTEFLIKA PRESSING PLENARY INTO NIGHT MEETINGS TO COMPLETE  
PALESTINE BY NOV 21. WITH KOREA NOT SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN  
FIRST COMMITTEE UNTIL NOV 25, HE COULD SUCCEED IN HAVING  
PLENARY OPEN KHMER DEBATE ON NOV 22, WITH UNFORESEEABLE IMPACT  
ON KOREA TIMING. WE AND ALLIES AGREED THAT DAYS' EVENTS HAD  
NOT CHANGED WISDOM OF MOVING RAPIDLY TO HAVE SUPPORTERS  
INSCRIBE TO SPEAK ON BOTH ITEMS, TO COMPLETE LOBBYING  
EFFORTS AND OTHERWISE TO PREPARE FOR EARLY DEBATE ON KHMER  
OR ON BOTH. WE ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT, EVEN IF TWO ISSUES ARE  
TAKEN UP SIMULTANEOUSLY, RISK, EVEN LIKELIHOOD, REMAINED THAT  
OTHER SIDE WOULD STILL WORK (BY MANIPULATING SPEAKERS'  
LISTS, ETC.) TO HAVE ACTUAL VOTE ON KHMER COME BEFORE  
THAT ON KOREA. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT MOTIVATING JUDGMENT  
OF HOSTILE COSPONSORS IS THAT PLENARY ACTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA  
AND PALESTINE WILL HAVE CREATED ATMOSPHERE UPON WHICH THEY  
SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CAPITALIZE.  
BENNETT

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